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County governments are the fastest growing level of local government in the United 
States.  B ased on a recent survey of counties in 46 states, this paper presents an overview 
of the size of county governments, the scope of county government services, and the 
extent of fiscal stress faced by county governments.   
 
 
I.  Introduction 
County governments are the fastest growing level of local government in the United 
States.  In recent years, the administrative and program responsibilities of county 
governments have expanded as federal programs have been devolved to the local level 
and as federal and state mandates have proliferated.  There is little systematic knowledge 
about how rural counties implement devolved government programs and the extent to 
which dismantling and privatization of locally-provided services has occurred.  Although 
the increased role of county governments in economic development is recognized in the 
literature, empirical documentation is sparse (Reese 1994).  Local economic development 
strategies, such as tax abatements, that appear to have increased in the1990s, are not well-
studied in rural areas.  Existing research on economic development activities centers 
almost entirely on states and municipalities, neglecting county governments, which are 
particularly important for rural people. 
   2
Congress, federal agencies, and even county governments themselves operate in an 
information vacuum with regards to the emerging role of county governments.  
Compared to the information available on governments at state and municipal levels, 
there is relatively little standardized information on county governments, and the 
available information is of relatively low quality.  The primary source of secondary data 
on county governments is the quinquennial Census of Governments, which focuses on 
revenues, expenditures, and employment in county governments,  but provides relatively 
little information about the nature of services that they provide.  The county government 
data in the Census of Governments is actually provided by states, not counties, and there 
exists no common methodology across states for gathering county level data.  While 
Census information on county governments appears to be fairly accurate for some states, 
for other states, researchers have found it to be very unreliable.  To help fill this 
information gap, researchers at Ohio State University and Colorado State University 
designed and implemented a nation-wide survey of county governments.  The survey was 
funded by the National Research Initiative (NRI) and carried out in conjunction with the 
National Association of Counties (NACo).  Questionnaires were sent in 2000 to over 
2800 counties in 46 states (all states except Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, and Rhode 
Island).  The survey response was 62 percent (though at the time this paper was written 
the response rate was 45 percent, so the results  presented here should be regarded as 
preliminary). 
 
This paper is a preliminary report on issues of devolution, local economic development, 
and welfare reform using data from the national survey of counties.  The purpose is to   3
present descriptive statistics on the size of county governments, the scope of county 
government services (particularly welfare, social, and economic development services) 
and the degree of fiscal stress faced by county governments. 
 
II.  Conceptual Foundations for Analyzing Localization of Growth Strategies 
Clarke and Gaile (1992) conclude that cutbacks in federal intergovernmental aid in the 
1980s led U.S. cities to turn to own-source revenues for economic development 
programs.  Similar changes appear to have occurred in the 1990s in rural areas in 
response to federal cutbacks (Johnson and Scott 1997). Counties are the most rapidly 
growing level of local government (Gold 1996:9), and we anticipate finding that rural 
counties have expanded their economic development role compared to the past.  Our 
analysis of a 1994 IMCA survey of 256 non-MSA county governments indicates that 
60% are leading participants in local economic development initiatives. Analysts have 
noted increased economic development activity by county governments in many states 
(Reese 1994).  In research conducted in 1999 in six Ohio River Valley states, Lobao, 
Rulli, and Brown found that 86% of county governments reported having economic 
development activities, and half of these counties reported an increase in economic 
development activities since 1990. 
 
Decentralized growth policy in an era of greater capital mobility has important 
implications for the type of growth strategies likely to emerge locally (Clarke and Gaile 
1992).  As the federal government diminishes its role in regional economic development, 
the behavior of local governments is likely to become more atomistic and counties can be   4
expected to increase efforts to attract private business to create growth and generate local 
income and tax revenues.  State and local tax rates are a key focus of interjurisdictional 
competition for businesses in the late 1990s.  The empirical literature on the effects of 
state and local taxation on economic development is inconclusive (Wasylenko 1997; 
Becsi 1996), yet it is widely maintained by economic development practitioners that state 
and local taxes are a major location determinant (Reese 1992), and this belief appears to 
drive local policies and programs (Courant 1994). 
 
The fiscal federalism literature predicts that as rivalry among local governments for 
mobile business assets increases, local tax rates get driven down to "benefit levels" 
(Oates and Schwab 1998): that is, rivalrous local governments tend to adjust taxes or 
services for each footloose firm to the point where the firm’s tax payment is just equal to 
its private benefit from the public services that the tax finances.  The increased 
interjurisdictional bidding in the form of "package deals" for new manufacturing plants, 
product distribution centers, and government facilities suggests that taxation of 
businesses has moved in the direction of "benefit taxation" (Donahue 1997).  More than 
40 states now have enabling legislative that allows state and local development agencies 
to offer tax abatements tailor-made for individual businesses as a location inducement.  A 
rational local government with full information would cease attracting businesses when 
the gain from bidding for another business just equals the cost.  This presumes, however, 
that local governments have the capacity to analyze accurately the costs and benefits of 
luring mobile capital and the capacity to negotiate a favorable deal for the community.  If 
they do not, it is likely that interjurisdictional competition will lead to increased local   5
government fiscal stress (Qian and Weingast, 1997; Wildasin, 1997; Qian and Roland, 
1996).  Wildasin (1997) argues that large jurisdictions face softer budget constraints than 
small jurisdictions because failure to bailout large local governments has more severe 
consequences for the entire economy.  Following this logic, rural county governments are 
more likely than their urban counterparts to experience fiscal stress as interjurisdictional 
competition increases since they are generally small, and traditional rural legislative and 
lobbying coalitions are giving way in many states to urban and suburban coalitions.  For 
example, the 1999 survey by Lobao and Brown in the six Ohio River Valley states found 
that rural counties are much likely than urban counties to draw on own-source funds 
rather than external funds to finance economic development activities. 
 
Johnson et al. (1995) extend urban fiscal-stress perspectives to rural counties, finding that 
structural attributes of non-metro counties, as well as recent decentralization, make them 
prone to fiscal stress.  Structural attributes include an older population which requires 
more services but contributes less to the economy than working-age populations, 
population loss which means that revenues must be raised from smaller tax bases, and 
poorer socioeconomic conditions which force local governments to put increased 
pressure on tax payers. 
 
For this study, we divide economic development strategies into two categories, which we 
term, respectively, firm-specific strategies and economic system strategies.  Firm-specific 
strategies are aids to specific businesses, particularly tax breaks, designed to address a 
perceived immediate impediment to job creation.  In contrast, economic-system strategies   6
address longer-run formation of human, physical, or social capital designed to improve 
the overall economic health of the region.   Firm-specific strategies tend to increase 
profits of a few individual firms without broadly benefiting other firms or households.  
Firm-specific strategies are likely to generate less surplus for the entire community as 
compared to economic-system strategies. We expect that county leaders are more likely 
to adopt firm-specific strategies if neighboring counties have adopted similar policies. 
 
We hypothesize that rural job quality (measured by average wages) and hence well-being 
will decline in regions with the most intense interjurisdictional competition among local 
governments. Bigger (often urban and suburban) local governments with relatively large 
budgets will be able to "cherrypick" the more attractive footloose firms.  Small rural 
county governments may not make it to the bargaining table at all if they lack 
professional economic development expertise.  Or they may make bids less generous than 
those offered by larger counties that are better able to deal with the risk of fiscal stress 
associated with tax abatements. 
 
III.  Conceptual Foundations for Analyzing Localization of Redistribution Strategies  
Analysts argue that local responsibilities for redistribution of goods and services have 
been increasing since the 1980s.  The Urban Institute’s New Federalism Project notes that 
“de-facto devolution occurred as federal government shifted responsibilities to states, and 
as state governments, facing budget pressures, assigned a low priority to helping local 
government and became more willing to allow localities to handle their own problems 
without state interference" (Watson and Gold 1997:2).  This shift intensified in the 1990s.    7
State and local governments would receive less aid; some of the most important 
programs, such as AFDC, were changed from open-ended, matching grants to block 
grants; and more local flexibility was given in operating programs (Gold 1977:1).   
Recent literature on decentralization of public programs makes two key points.  First, 
Staeheli et al. (1997) argue that decentralization represents not just "devolution" (passing 
of responsibilities from the federal to state and local government) but the dismantling and 
privatization of programs. Second, this shift “will increase geographic disparities in the 
role and effect of government,” with locales having less material resources and 
organizational capacity less able to successfully assume redistributive functions (Kodras 
1997:80).  We conceptualize localization of redistribution in terms of county responses 
to: 1) devolution of specific federal programs; 2) dismantling of services provided to 
county residents; 3) privatization of services formerly provided to county residents.  We 
focus on service delivery activities that directly affect counties' human resource base 
(e.g., county services related to health, workforce development, elder-child programs).  
We focus, in particular, on programs stemming from the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PL104-193), which converted the former AFDC 
program to Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) in 1996.  This bill 
consolidates federal AFDC funding, state and county AFDC administration, Emergency 
Assistance (EA), and the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills program into block grants for 
states.  A NACo (1998) survey indicates that 56 percent of county governments 
administer TANF-related programs, such as welfare-to-work,
 a figure similar to that 
found in our six-state pilot test.  Some reports suggest welfare reform is stressing county 
and other local social services (Center for Urban Economic Development 1998; Institute   8
for Women's Policy Research 1998).  We will test for the extent to which problems in 
implementing welfare reform and the dismantling or privatization of public services 
occur in the same locales. 
  What types of counties are likely to encounter problems in implementing welfare 
reform and to have dismantled or privatized public services?  How do the new 
decentralized arrangements affect local well-being?  Difficulty in implementing devolved 
services and the likelihood of dismantling or privatizing public services is expected to be 
greater in counties that are poorer, rural, and fiscally stressed and where government 
support for citizen well-being has been weak historically.  For welfare, food stamps, SSI 
and child nutrition programs, "the most remote rural areas, persistent-poverty, income 
transfer dependent counties, and mining-dependent counties" would be most affected by 
real declines in social spending (ERS 1997:46).  With regard to welfare reform, some 
analysts anticipate a "spatial mismatch" of jobs that will prevent poorer states and 
counties from implementing successful workfare programs (Goetz and Freshwater 1997; 
Jensen and Chitose 1997; Southern Rural Development Center 1997). Past experiences 
with other block grant programs show that rural areas find it harder to obtain and 
implement grants (RUPRI 1995). Prior to welfare reform, Nord (1999) found that ADFC  
benefits were lower in states that are more rural, while there was no rural disadvantage in 
food stamp levels.  The 1999 Ohio River Valley pilot shows that relative to metro 
counties, non-metro counties lack staff such as grants writers, are less likely to have 
workforce development and welfare-to-work programs, and are more likely to report 
pressures due to service demands. 
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IV. Survey-based Description of County Governments 
Size of county government.  We measured county government size by the number of 
employees and categorized counties into eight size categories (0-24, 25-49, 50-99, 100-
249, 250-499, 500-749, 750-999, and 1500 or more).  For all U.S. counties, the mode is 
100-249 employees, with 27 percent of counties reporting employment in this range.  For 
nonmetro counties, the mode is 50-99 employees with 31 percent of nonmetro counties 
falling in this category.  At the lower end of the size range, 4.7 percent of nonmetro 
counties but only 0.3 percent of metro counties fall into the smallest category (0-24 
employees).  At the upper end, 38 percent of metro counties but only 0.8 percent of 
nonmetro counties fall into the largest category (1500 or more employees). 
 
Services provided by county governments.  The service provided most widely by county 
governments is law enforcement.  In the U.S. as a whole, 84 percent of counties provide 
law enforcement, and there are almost no difference between metro and  nonmetro 
counties.  The second most widely provided service is 911 service.  Seventy nine percent 
of all counties, 77 percent of nonmetro counties, and 86 percent of metro counties 
provide this service.  The third most widely provided service is health clinic service.  
Forty-nine percent of all counties, 45 percent of nonmetro counties, and 63 percent of 
metro counties provide this service.   
 
Among the remaining service, we focus on services for which there were large 
differences between metro and nonmetro county governments.  Water and sewer is 
provided by 46 percent of metro governments and by 18 percent of nonmetro   10 
governments.  Bus service is provided by 30 percent of metro governments and by 14 
percent of nonmetro governments.  Child Care or Head Start is provided by 26 percent of 
metro governments and by 12 percent of nonmetro governments.  Drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation are provided by 38 percent of metro governments and by 18 percent of 
nonmetro governments.  Elder care is provided by 37 percent of metro governments and 
by 16 percent of nonmetro governments.  Housing assistance is provided by 44 percent of 
metro governments and by 14 percent of nonmetro governments.  Mental health services 
are provided by 55 percent of metro governments and by 34 percent of nonmetro 
counties.  Nutrition programs are provided by 43 percent of metro counties and by 25 
percent of nonmetro counties.   Senior citizens programs are provided by 60 percent of 
metro counties and by 45 percent of nonmetro counties.  Public housing is provided by 16 
percent of metro counties and by 9 percent of nonmetro counties.  Shelters for battered 
persons are provided by 16 percent of metro counties and by 10 percent of nonmetro 
counties.  Homeless shelters are provided by 10 percent of metro governments and by 3 
percent of nonmetro governments.    
 
Other services are provided by a roughly equal s hare of metro and nonmetro 
governments.  These services are: solid waste removal (36 percent), fire protection 
(metro, 40 percent; nonmetro, 37 percent), emergency medical services (metro, 43 
percent; nonmetro 45 percent), food pantry (metro, 11 percent; n onmetro, 10 percent), 
hospital (metro, 16 percent; nonmetro, 16 percent), and landfill (metro, 39 percent; 
nonmetro, 37 percent). 
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We also asked who produced the services provided by county government, focusing on 
whether contract services were provided by private companies or non-profit 
organizations.  Among all counties, the services that are contracted out most often are 
solid waste removal (30 percent of all counties) and public housing (24 percent of all 
counties).  Only 17 percent of nonmetro governments but 43 percent of metro counties 
had privatized the production or delivery of any of services over the past five years. 
 
In “new economy” services, nonmetro governments lag behind metro governments.  
Eight two percent of metro governments but only 41 p ercent of nonmetro governments 
report that they have a county government web site. 
 
Economic Development Activities of County Governments.  Metro and nonmetro 
governments differ a great deal in the personnel devoted to economic development.  Sixty 
one percent of metro county governments but only 34 percent of nonmetro governments 
have one or more economic development professionals on their staff. 
 
Even when they have no economic development professions on staff, county 
governments often engage in economic d evelopment planning and implementation.  
Seventy two percent of all county government but 81 percent of metro governments and 
69 percent of nonmetro governments reported playing a role in local economic 
development.   Fifty one percent of all county governments but 54 percent of metro 
governments and 49 percent of nonmetro governments report that county government is 
one of the two most important players in economic development in the county.     12 
 
Forty three percent of all county governments report devoting  a portion of their economic 
development budget to activities designed to promote small business startups.  Fifty six 
percent of county governments engage in attraction of outside businesses.   The same 
percentage of counties – 56 percent – engage in business retention and expansion.     
 
Nonmetro county governments are much more likely to engage in no economic 
development activities at all than metro governments.   Fifty percent of nonmetro 
counties, compared to 38 percent of metro governments, do not engage in small business 
development.  Forty percent of nonmetro governments, compared to 21 percent of metro 
governments, do not budget for attraction of outside businesses.  Forty percent of 
nonmetro governments, compared to 20 percent of metro governments, do not engage in 
business retention and expansion. 
 
In addition to comparing across counties, it is useful to compare a county’s economic 
development activities today with its activities in the past.  For all counties, attraction of 
outside businesses increased at a more rapid rate than small business activities or 
business retention and expansion.  Thirty nine percent of all county governments reported 
a greater focus on business attraction today than five years ago, though the increase 
change was much greater in metro counties (50 percent) than in nonmetro counties (34 
percent).  The economic development activity that increased at the slowest rate is 
business retention and expansion.  Twenty six percent of all governments but 32 percent   13 
of metro governments and 24 percent of nonmetro governments reported increases in 
business retention and expansion. 
 
Nonmetro counties have expanded their economic development activities over the past 
five years to a lesser extent than metro counties.  Two percent of nonmetro counties but 
10 percent of metro counties report increased travel over the past five years to recruit new 
business.  Fourteen percent of nonmetro counties but 18 percent of metro counties report 
more use of tax abatements today than five years ago.  Thirteen percent of nonmetro 
governments but 21 percent of metro governments report engaging in more national 
advertising of the county as a place to do business as compared to five years ago.  Twenty 
percent of nonmetro counties and 39 percent of metro counties report engaging in more 
workforce development activities for low-income workers today than five years ago.   
 
Land Use Planning Activities of County Governments.  There are enormous differences 
between metro and nonmetro county government in land use planning activities.  Seventy 
one percent of metro governments but only 31 percent of nonmetro governments have a 
land use planner on staff.  Sixty four percent of metro governments but only 38 percent of 
nonmetro governments have adopted a land use plan.  Seventy percent of metro 
governments but only 40 percent of nonmetro governments engage in comprehensive 
planning.  Forty percent of metro governments but only 17 percent of nonmetro 
governments have farmland preservation policies in place.  Twenty percent o f metro 
governments but only four percent of nonmetro governments have enacted impact fees.  
Forty three percent of metro counties but only 19 percent of nonmetro counties have   14 
wetland protection policies.  Twenty six percent of metro counties but only nine percent 
of nonmetro counties have enacted growth boundaries.  Forty three percent of metro 
counties but only 23 percent of nonmetro counties engage in watershed planning or 
management.  Sixty three percent of metro counties but only 44 percent of nonmetro 
counties regulate land use through zoning.  Eleven percent of metro counties and 27 
percent of nonmetro counties report engaging in no land use planning activities of any 
kind. 
 
Finances of County Governments.  In general, nonmetro county governments report 
greater fiscal stress than metro governments.  Thirty two percent of nonmetro 
governments but only 22 percent of metro governments report that loss of federal revenue 
is a “very important” problem.   Forty two percent of nonmetro governments and 36 
percent of metro governments report that decline in state revenue is a very important 
problem.  Thirty four percent of nonmetro governments but only 10 percent of metro 
governments report that decline in the tax base is a very important problem.  Fifty eight 
percent of counties – equal in both metro and nonmetro counties – report mandated costs 
from higher levels of government represent a very important problem.   
 
Nonmetro governments have less capacity to seek grant funds as compared to metro 
governments.  F orty nine percent of metro governments but only 27 percent of nonmetro 
governments report having a grant writer on staff. 
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Nonmetro residents appear to prefer leaner local government as compared to metro 
residents.  Forty percent of nonmetro governments but 45 percent of metro governments 
report that rising service demands from citizens represent a very important problem.  
Thirty three percent of nonmetro governments but only 20 percent of metro governments 
report pressures from local taxpayers to reduce taxes represent a very important problem.   
 
Human Services and Welfare Reform Activities of County Governments.  Nonmetro 
county governments report smaller increases in their administrative workload for a 
number of programs over the past three years, as compared to metro governments.  
Administrative duties related to childcare are reported to have increased in 37 percent of 
metro counties but only 19 percent of nonmetro counties.  Administrative duties related 
to food stamps are reported in have increased in 20 percent of metro counties but only 12 
percent of nonmetro counties.  Administrative duties related to workforce development 
and training programs are reported to have increased in 45 percent of metro counties but 
and 27 percent of nonmetro counties.  
 
In general, nonmetro counties report less shortage of funding for human services and 
related activities as compared to metro counties.  Twenty five percent of all counties but 
36 percent of metro counties and 21 percent of nonmetro counties report facing f unding 
shortages for services to the aging and elderly.  Twenty percent of all counties but 30 
percent of metro counties and 16 percent of nonmetro counties report funding shortage 
for child care and foster services.  Twenty one percent of all counties but 33 percent of   16 
metro counties and 17 percent of nonmetro counties report funding shortages for 
transportation. 
 
Nonmetro counties are less involved in welfare reform than metro counties.  Thirty five 
percent of metro counties but only 18 percent of nonmetro counties administer 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), the primary welfare program in the 
United States today.  Forty three percent of metro counties but only 23 percent of 
nonmetro counties report having implemented a jobs program for county welfare 
recipients in response to welfare reform legislation. 
 
V. Conclusions 
County governments place an important role in public service provision, economic 
development, land use planning and regulation, and welfare reform.   This paper has 
focused on d ifferences between metro and nonmetro counties using data from a national 
survey of counties in 46 states. 
 
Several generalizations can be drawn from the preliminary survey data available as of 
May, 2001.  First, nonmetro county governments are considerably smaller on average 
than metro governments.  Second, while many nonmetro county governments are 
important service providers, nonmetro governments generally provide fewer services than 
metro governments.  Third, nearly half of nonmetro county governments r eport playing a 
key role in economic development in their county, though a much smaller percentage of 
nonmetro county governments have an economic development profession on staff as   17 
compared to metro counties.  Furthermore, nonmetro governments report a slower rate of 
increase over the past five years in economic development activities as compared to 
metro governments.  Fourth, nonmetro county governments are much less likely to 
engage in land use planning and regulation than metro governments.  Fifth, a larger 
percentage of nonmetro county governments report experiencing fiscal stress as 
compared to metro governments.  Exacerbating this problem, nonmetro county 
governments are much less likely to have a grant writer on staff.  Sixth, nonmetro county 
governments report less increase in recent years in administrative workload related to 
human services.  Nonmetro counties also report less shortage of funding for human 
services than metro counties.  Seventh, nonmetro counties are less involved in welfare 
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